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How does the problem of limited and bundled choice in the public sector relate to economic efficiency? Why are public bureaucracies possibly less efficient than business firms?

Short Answer

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Economic inefficiency in the public sector arises due to the poor selection of goods/programs that are offered in a bundled choice that involves efficient and inefficient goods/programs together at the same time.

Public bureaucracies are less efficient because they are run by welfare motive and do not process the concept of internal efficiency.

Step by step solution

01

Inefficiency in the public sector

Different goods, services, programs, or policies are clubbed together in different sectors in the public sector. This leaves lesser options for selection. The bundled stocks of programs/policies may have positive and negative benefits altogether. This leads to economic inefficiency only if there is a poor selection (the total cost of the selection exceeds its total benefits).

For instance, candidates in the assembly elections present an allocation of resources as a party's agenda to gather votes. The allocation includes different programs and policies in certain combinations, which could be beneficial for some and bad for others. The public must agree on one out of the limited choices to choose their next representative.

Economic inefficiency arises when the selected bundle (or representative) creates losses in terms of certain policies. This cannot be ignored as the limited bundles offer both good and bad options together in the same bundle.

Thus, the legislation and the public have to accept that stock which has a greater net positive effect. However, it will include the negative impacts as well, creating economic inefficiency.

02

Public bureaucracies less efficient than private firms

Public bureaucracies are relatively less efficient than business firms because of the following reasons:

  • Unlike private firms, public bureaucracies do not run for profit motives (benefit >cost). They carry on the functioning even if they fail to manage their resources properly. They have the burden of uplifting the sick units of the economy, and their motive is the welfare of society. So, to improve society, they pay the economic efficiency as the opportunity cost.
  • Business firms provide incentives to their employees at each hierarchal stage to work efficiently. The incentives may be in the form of shared profit, bonuses, salary hikes, or promotions. Public organizations do not offer such incentives to their employees to encourage efficient working in the organizations.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Consider a corrupt provincial government in which each housing inspector examines two newly built structures each week. All the builders in the province are unethical and want to increase their profits by using substandard construction materials, but they can’t do that unless they can bribe a housing inspector into approving a substandard building.

a. If bribes cost \(1,000 each, how much will a housing inspector make each year in bribes? (Assume that each inspector works 52 weeks a year and gets bribed for every house he or she inspects.)

b. There is a provincial construction supervisor who gets to hire all of the housing inspectors. He himself is corrupt and expects his housing inspectors to share their bribes with him. Suppose that 20 inspectors work for him and that each passes along half the bribes collected from builders. How much will the construction supervisor collect each year?

c. Corrupt officials may have an incentive to reduce the provision of government services to help line their own pockets. Suppose that the provincial construction supervisor decides to cut the total number of housing inspectors from 20 to 10 in order to decrease the supply of new housing permits. This decrease in the supply of permits raises the equilibrium bribe from \)1,000 to \(2,500. How much per year will the construction supervisor now receive if he is still getting half of all the bribes collected by the 10 inspectors? How much more is the construction supervisor getting now than when he had 20 inspectors working in part b? Will he personally be happy with the reduction in government services?

d. What would happen if reducing the number of inspectors from 20 to 10 only increased the equilibrium bribe from \)1,000 to $1,500? In this case, how much per year would the construction supervisor collect from his 10 inspectors? How much less is the construction supervisor getting than when he had 20 inspectors working in part b? In this case, will the construction supervisor be happy with the reduction in government services? Will he want to go back to using 20 inspectors?

Consider a specific example of the special-interest effect and the collective-action problem. In 2012, it was estimated that the total value of all corn-production subsidies in the United States was about \(3 billion. The population of the United States was approximately 300 million people that year.

a. On average, how much did corn subsidies cost per person in the United States in 2012? (Hint: A billion is a 1 followed by nine zeros. A million is a 1 followed by six zeros.)

b. If each person in the United States is willing to spend only \)0.50 to support efforts to overturn the corn subsidy, and if anti-subsidy advocates can only raise funds from 10 percent of the population, how much money will they be able to raise for their lobbying efforts?

c. If the recipients of corn subsidies donate just 1 percent of the total amount that they receive in subsidies, how much could they raise to support lobbying efforts to continue the corn subsidy?

d. By how many dollars does the amount raised by the recipients of the corn subsidy exceed the amount raised by the opponents of the corn subsidy?

Look back at Figures 5.2a and 5.2b, which show the costs and benefits to voters Garcia, Johnson, and Lee of two different public goods that the government will produce if a majority of voters support them. Suppose that Garcia, Johnson, and Lee have decided to have one single vote at which the funding for both of those public goods will be decided simultaneously.

a. Given the $300 cost per person of each public good, what are Garcia’s net benefits for each public good individually and for the two combined? Will she vote yes or no on the proposal to fund both projects simultaneously?

b. What are Lee’s net benefits for each public good individually and for the two combined? Will she vote yes or no on the proposal to fund both projects simultaneously?

c. What are Johnson’s net benefits for each public good individually and for the two combined? Will he vote yes or no on the proposal to fund both projects simultaneously—or will he be indifferent?

d. Who is the median voter here? Whom will the two other voters be attempting to persuade?

Use your demand schedule for the public good, determined in problem 1, and the following supply schedule to ascertain the optimal quantity of this public good.

Price (\()
Qd
191
162
133
104
75
46
27
18
Price (\))Qs
1910
168
136
104
72
41
2-
1-

Draw a production possibilities curve with public goods on the vertical axis and private goods on the horizontal axis. Assuming the economy is initially operating on the curve, indicate how the production of public goods might be increased. How might the output of public goods be increased if the economy is initially operating at a point inside the curve?

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